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Migrant girls in Shenzhen: gender, education and the urbanisation of aspiration 
 
Charlotte Goodburn  
Lau China Institute, King’s College London 
  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of rural-urban migration on primary-school-aged migrant 
girls in China, providing important data on this unexplored group as well as drawing several 
larger conclusions about the evolving relationship between migration and women’s 
autonomy. Much recent literature has focused on Chinese young unmarried women migrants. 
However, there has been no attempt to distinguish migration’s effects on children by gender, 
and little research on the “new generation” of married women migrants. This paper focuses 
on two aspects of migrant girls’ wellbeing, education and migration satisfaction, comparing 
girls’ assessments with those of their parents, particularly mothers. It analyses differences 
between girls’ and parents’ views, arguing that specific parental concerns about daughters 
shape girls’ futures in a way not applied to migrant boys. A further, broader, implication of 
this analysis is that certain benefits of migration, previously thought to apply exclusively to 
single women, extend also to married women, influencing mothers when forming goals for 
their daughters’ futures. 
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 2 
In the last three decades, China has seen the world’s largest urban-rural migration. In 2012 it 
was estimated that there were over 260 million rural migrants in China’s cities, and that over 
half of China’s population now lives in urban areas, compared with just a fifth in the 1980s1. 
Most rural migrants do not possess an urban household registration (hukou 户口), and are 
thus excluded from full access to many state goods and services in their urban area of 
residence. This is as true of the so-called “new generation” of migrant workers, born since the 
1980s, as it was of the previous generation. What is different is that the new generation 
contains a much increased proportion of women migrants, including many married women 
who migrate with their husbands, and a large number of migrant children who accompany 
parents to the city.
2
 According to a 2011 survey by the All-China Women’s Federation, over 
half of new-generation migrant workers are women.
3
 For rural families, sole migration of the 
husband to urban areas for work is increasingly giving way to couple migration and 
household migration.
4
 The same survey estimates that there are now 35.8 million migrant 
children in China’s cities, up from 25.5 million in 2005.5 Around 20 million of these are 
thought to be between 6 and 14 years old and entitled to receive free compulsory education.
6
 
 
Despite the shift in migration patterns, here has been surprisingly little work on the impact of 
migrating on married women in China, especially compared with the large body of literature 
on unmarried women migrants (usually aged approximately 16-25). Empirical studies of this 
latter group suggest strongly that, despite challenges and discrimination in urban China, 
migration promotes women’s autonomy. Separation from older family members and the 
influence of urban culture create different expectations of women’s familial and social roles.7 
Young women feel more confident and self-aware as a result of migration.
8
 Many negotiate 
greater autonomy within their families, marry later than non-migrants and acquire savings and 
other personal property which increase their social status.9 In fact, some young women migrate 
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 3 
specifically in order to gain independence and to try to avoid marriage into agricultural 
households with strongly patriarchal attitudes.
10
  
 
By comparison, the little existing work on new-generation married women migrants suggests 
a much less positive outcome. Unlike single women, married women are not able to 
renegotiate familial gender relations as a result of migration. Instead, they face severe 
disadvantage in the urban labour force and are subject to continued restrictive gender roles 
within the household.
11
 However, whether this is changing as a result of continued increases 
in household migration during the late 2000s is unknown.  Similarly, despite an increasing 
interest in the impact of migration on children, there has been very little research specifically 
on migrant girls. Whether girls who migrate with their families benefit in the same way as 
young unmarried women migrating alone, or whether possible negative consequences, such 
as those which are claimed to affect married women migrating with households, outweigh 
potential gains, is unclear. Despite increases in the numbers of rural migrant children in 
China’s cities, research on their experiences remains both limited and “gender-blind”. 
 
This article primarily examines the impact of rural-urban migration on migrant girls, but also 
provides important insights into the relationship between migration and gender from the 
perspectives of migrant mothers, suggesting that the picture for these married women may 
not be as bleak as previously thought.  It is based on analysis of interviews I conducted with 
migrant parents and children in Shenzhen city in 2008-2009. The next section outlines my 
research methods. The third section examines the impact of migration on girls’ education, 
and suggests how this may differ from the effects on boy’s schooling. The fourth part focuses 
on girls’ perceptions of their wellbeing after migration, comparing this with parents’ ideas 
about daughters’ wellbeing, and identifies two perceived benefits of urban life for girls 
beyond formal schooling, the first of which relates to concepts of daughters’ “quality”. The 
second benefit, which relates to “urban skills”, is analysed further in the fifth section, which 
examines mothers’ perceptions of the advantages of urban life for young girls, and suggests 
that married women benefit from migration in several important ways. Mothers are keen to 
pass these benefits on to their daughters and have strongly urban aspirations for girls’ futures. 
However, my conclusion suggests a more complex picture: although parents view the city as 
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providing great benefits to daughters, the problems migrant girls face in receiving a decent 
education in urban China may make it difficult for them ultimately to realise their parents’ 
ambitions.   
 
Research Methods 
 
Shenzhen has the largest number of rural-urban migrants of any Chinese city.
12
 Since 
becoming China’s first Special Economic Zone in 1980, it has become a major 
manufacturing centre of southern China, with a population of approximately 14 million – of 
whom only around 2 million have a Shenzhen hukou. Most rural migrants work in factories, 
particularly younger, new-generation migrants, although many also engage in informal sector 
small businesses such as market vending, including many of those who have migrated as a 
household. The number of migrant children in Shenzhen is unknown, but is at least 543,000 
according to local government figures.
13
 
 
Interviews with 92 migrant parents (63 mothers and 29 fathers) and 66 children (41 girls and 
25 boys) were conducted within the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen from May 2008 to 
January 2009. Index children of parents interviewed and the separate (mostly unrelated) 
group of children interviewed were all aged 6-12 years, both at the time of migration and of 
interview, and had migrated not more than five years earlier. Interviews focused on education 
before and after migration, and on children’s and parent’s preferences for city or village as 
the best place for the child to live. 
 
Most informants were found through door-to-door interviewing in migrant communities, but 
I also visited factories and other workplaces, and occasionally migrants introduced me to 
other informants. Parents came from 12 Chinese provinces and were drawn from eight 
Shenzhen fieldwork sites, so although the sample is not random I anticipate that the data is 
broadly representative for the purposes of comparing children’s education and wellbeing by 
gender. My sample of children is less representative, especially of school experiences, since 
most children were identified from within the four migrant schools where I taught English 
language.  
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Because of difficulties in gaining “informed consent” among such young children, I asked if 
children were happy to talk and explained that they could stop at any point or not answer any 
question. I was alert for non-verbal signs that the child did not want to continue, and did not 
pursue any purposefully evasive answers, but I found most children were keen to talk. In fact, 
it was difficult to turn away many children who wanted to participate but did not fit my 
criteria, so I asked a few token questions of many “unsuitable” children. All interviews were 
conducted in Mandarin. The names of informants used here are pseudonyms, since much of 
the information was sensitive or potentially compromising. 
 
My interview data faces the limitation that informants’ memories may not have been entirely 
accurate. This is a particular problem for pre-migration details, since interviewees, including 
children, had to recall details from up to five years previously. A larger issue is the difficulty 
of generalising from these case studies. While the material illuminates some of the long- and 
short-term impacts of migration to Shenzhen, whether it can provide larger generalisations 
about China is much less clear. Furthermore, the small sample of migrant families means that 
many conclusions even about Shenzhen can be only tentative.  
 
Migration, schooling and the gender difference 
 
Much literature, in both English and Chinese, has examined the educational problems of 
migrant children. Until 1993 migrants were barred from enrolling in urban state schools and, 
even after they were officially allowed entry, high legal and extra-legal fees prevented most 
from receiving a state education.
14
 Since the nationwide abolition of all tuition fees in 2008, 
migrant children, like all children, are entitled to receive nine years of compulsory education 
free of charge. However, many city governments lack the incentives and financial resources 
to accommodate migrant children. A significant proportion therefore continues to be 
excluded from the state education system and enrolled in private, usually unlicensed, migrant 
schools. 
Whereas certain other large Chinese cities, notably Shanghai, have undertaken campaigns to 
incorporate migrant children into state schools and to license official migrant schools, these 
have been lacking in Shenzhen. Although official statistics claimed that around 60% of 
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migrant children in Shenzhen attended state schools in 2002, this figure included only 
migrant households officially registered with a temporary residence certificate, and is 
therefore likely to exclude most migrant children.
15
 In fact, only migrant children formally 
registered with the local Education Department are eligible to enter Shenzhen state schools.
16
 
The conditions for registration in 2008-2009 included the provision of six official documents, 
known as the wu jia yi 五加一: five certificates and one proof. These were: hukou and 
temporary residence certificate; family planning certificate; school transfer letter; birth 
certificate; social insurance certificates of both parents; and property deed or officially-
stamped rental contract. Very few migrant parents had all of these documents, so the majority 
of migrant children were unable to attend state schools. 
 
Enrolment 
 
Few children were not enrolled in school at all. Only four of 92 parents I interviewed 
reported that their child did not attend either state or migrant school, of which three were 
girls described as “too young”, though aged 8-9 at the time of interview.17 As my interviews 
focused only on children aged over 6 years, I cannot report accurately when younger migrant 
children began school in Shenzhen, but many younger sisters of index children were not 
enrolled in school despite being over 6. Delayed enrolment in school had already been more 
common for girls than boys before migration, with 65% of boys (30) having started school 
aged 6 or less, compared with 45% of girls (20), and migration seemed to have exacerbated 
this. Delayed enrolment may be related to the high costs of schooling in the city. While state 
schools are free from tuition and textbook fees from 2008 for those able to enrol, the private 
schools attended by most migrant children charged a mean monthly fee of RMB295 – a 
significant burden to most migrant parents.
18
  
The case of a 10-year-old girl from rural northern Guangdong was typical. Ceoncau migrated 
to Shenzhen aged five, but did not attend school until the age of nine. She had three elder 
siblings and her family could not afford to educate her until her eldest sister finished school. 
Ceoncau was now struggling academically and socially in the second year of a local migrant 
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 7 
school, among classmates two to three years younger. Many parents had similar stories, and 
although the costs of schooling could delay enrolment of younger boys, it was more common 
for girls. In some cases, even girls with enrolled younger brothers were out-of-school. One 
Guangdong father of two sons (aged 7 and 11) and a daughter (8), commented: 
 
“School fees in Shenzhen are extremely expensive. If we had a lot of money, of 
course we would send all our children to school now. But our sons go to school, 
and that is what is most important. The little girl will go to school a bit later – 
when we have earned more money!” 
 
Type of school 
 
Migration not only affected age of enrolment, but type of school attended. Before migration, 
almost all parents said that their child had attended state school.
19
 After migration, however, 
78% (72) attended unofficial private school, with only 17% (16) in state school. A smaller 
proportion of girls (14% [6]) attended state school than boys (22% [10]). This was not 
statistically significant (unsurprising given the small number of children attending state 
school), but is nonetheless interesting, since parental interviews suggested several important 
reasons girls were less likely to be enrolled in state schools.  
 
The first was that male births were more often officially registered, so that more boys were 
able to provide the essential birth certificate and hukou in order to enter state school. Since 
rural family planning quotas allow couples a second child if their first is a girl, and since 
registration of out-of-plan births involves a large fine, many higher order female births were 
not officially registered. Furthermore, I found that even some elder and second daughters 
were unregistered, so that the family could “try again” for at least one son. Moreover, even 
where boys were born out-of-plan, they were more frequently registered than girls, since 
many parents of younger sons thought the fine worth paying to include boys on the family 
hukou. The bureaucratic restrictions on state school entry therefore had a disproportionate 
effect on girls.  
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 8 
Another reason for lower enrolment of migrant girls in state schools was that some parents 
saw sons’ education as more important, making more effort to acquire documents, undertake 
admissions procedures, purchase equipment and pay for transport to send sons to state 
schools, which were often far from migrant communities. During home visits with students 
from migrant schools, some parents focused the discussion exclusively on their son’s 
education, even if I taught their daughter and not their son. However, as Hannum has noted 
for rural China, the emphasis on boys’ schooling over girls’ was less pronounced in single-
child families, perhaps because of more resources available to invest in the child’s schooling, 
or because these parents would be dependent on their child in old age, regardless of sex.
20
  
 
The fact that migrant children, and especially girls, attend migrant schools rather than state 
schools is relevant to assessing the impact of migration, because of the large difference in 
education quality. Research in other Chinese cities has demonstrated the inferiority of 
migrant schools compared with state schools, and Shenzhen is no exception.
21
 Migrant 
parents in Shenzhen were well aware of the disparity in educational quality, and even many 
children knew that local state schools were much better equipped. Common complaints were 
poorly trained teachers, poor facilities, overcrowding and bad discipline. Furthermore, not 
only were migrant schools perceived as worse than Shenzhen state schools, but were seen as 
worse even than the rural state schools children had previously attended. Only 24% of parents 
(17) whose children attended private school thought the city school was better than in the 
home village, and even many parents who described the village school as bad thought it 
preferable to the migrant school.  
 
Children’s answers were similar. Only 10% (6) of those attending a migrant school thought 
that their teachers were good. Several spoke of problems of discipline and violence, and I 
witnessed many violent incidents in the schools. One seven-year-old girl told me that she 
cried everyday walking to school, because older children would hit her and steal her 
belongings. Another girl reported that some children were always bullied, and that even the 
teacher was afraid to speak to them, since older boys would then bully the teacher too. No 
child said he/she had been afraid in the village school.  
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The perceived superiority of rural schooling was such that some parents planned to send 
children, particularly boys, back to the village to be educated. 28% of boys (13) and 9% of 
girls (4) would be sent back within two years. Most of these were children were aged 10-12 who 
would begin junior-middle school in the countryside. Not only quality but also length of 
schooling was a problem for migrant children, since although migrant junior-middle schools were 
available in Shenzhen, few migrant senior-middle schools existed. Parents who wanted their child 
to stay at school after the compulsory education period would usually send the child back to the 
village. Since few parents themselves planned to return, children would live with grandparents. 
Given the poor quality of migrant schools and the lack of higher-level schooling, it may seem 
surprising that more parents did not plan to send their child home to be educated. I will analyse 
the reasons for this, and the gender difference, in the following section. 
 
Overall, the effect of migration on girls’ school attendance is small, though it may delay 
enrolment for some, causing further problems. The effect on the quality of schooling received 
is much more serious. Although both sexes struggle to enter higher-quality state schools after 
migration, girls face more obstacles than boys, particularly if they come from large families. 
Instead they overwhelmingly attend private migrant schools, where the education is worse 
(and is recognised by both parents and children as worse) not only than state schools in the 
city but even than those in home villages. It seems plausible, then, that while the education of 
both boys and girls suffers after migration, girls do worse educationally from migrating than 
boys.   
 
 
Migration, girls’ wellbeing and “outside-school education” 
 
Given the greater obstacles girls face in gaining access to decent quality state schools, it is 
probably not surprising that fewer migrant girls than boys expressed satisfaction with life in 
the city. What is surprising is that a statistically-significantly greater proportion of parents of 
girls said that the city was the better place for their child to live, compared with parents of 
boys. This section discusses boys’ and girls’ preferences for city or village, examines how 
and why children’s and parents’ views of girls’ wellbeing differ, and analyses the reasons 
why parents, particularly mothers, want their daughters to remain in Shenzhen despite the 
negative educational consequences. In analysing these complex and apparently contradictory 
findings, I show that close study of the attitudes of  migrant girls and their parents leads to 
 10 
novel conclusions about the impact of migration on married women and the broader 
relationship between migration, gender and urban versus rural life in contemporary China. 
 
Neither boys nor girls preferred the village overall, but a much smaller proportion of girls 
than boys said that they preferred to live in the city (Table 1). Satisfaction with city life did 
not increase with time spent there – in fact, girls’ preference for the village was more 
common among those who had been in Shenzhen longer,  whereas for boys, time spent in 
Shenzhen made no difference. Questions about where the child was happier produced similar 
answers, with 84% of boys (21) but only 59% (24) of girls happier in the city. By contrast, 
parents whose index child was a girl showed a statistically significantly stronger view that 
Shenzhen was the better place for their child at present.
22
  This opinion was strongest of all in 
mothers of girls. 
 
Table 1: Which place is better for children to live now? Parent and child answers 
 City % (n) Village % (n) Don’t know % (n) 
Girls 63 (26) 29 (12) 7 (3) 
Boys 84 (21) 16 (4) - 
Parents of girl 89 (39) 11 (5) - 
Parents of boy 65 (30) 35 (16) - 
Source: interview data 
 
Why do parents’ and children’s views diverge? And how can parents’ views that Shenzhen is 
better than the village for girls be reconciled with the damning accounts many gave of the 
quality of their daughters’ education? I argue that it is not simply that parents see education 
as unimportant for girls, and the negative impact of migration on their schooling is therefore 
thought less significant. Instead, I suggest that parents have particular concerns about 
daughters’ futures, and mothers’ perceptions of the benefits they themselves have received as 
a result of migration influence them in valuing other aspects of urban life for girls above and 
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beyond formal education. This in turn leads us to a broader understanding of migrant 
perceptions of the role of women and girls in rural and urban China.  
 
While some parents, especially in large families, expressed more interest in sons’ education, 
none said that educating daughters was pointless, and even those whose daughters were 
unenrolled acknowledged the importance of girls’ schooling. Many parents were very 
concerned about schooling quality. Even those whose working hours precluded attending 
school meetings, or whose lack of education prevented them from assisting with schoolwork, 
seemed concerned with their child’s school performance. Many punished their child if he/she 
did not study diligently, and most made substantial sacrifices to afford school fees. It 
therefore seems odd that parents overwhelmingly viewed Shenzhen as a better place than the 
village for daughters to live, despite the worse schools most children (particularly girls) 
attended.  
 
The activities (huodong 活动) and especially lifestyle (shenghuo 生活) girls could experience 
in the city were felt by most parents to be far better than those for girls in the village. In 
particular, seeing tall buildings, cars and luxury shopping malls were mentioned by many as 
examples of the city “lifestyle”, as well as amenities more commonly used by migrant 
families such as supermarkets, buses, street lights and paved roads. While parents also 
discussed sons’ urban activities, they seemed far more important for daughters, whereas other 
advantages of the city for sons, such as that the family had more disposable income, the 
accommodation was superior or the natural environment was better, were not mentioned at 
all for girls. Girls themselves also emphasised the activities and lifestyle of Shenzhen 
compared with the village, describing Shenzhen as “ much more fun” (haowan  duo le 好玩
多了) “modern” (xiandai 现代) and “developed” (fada 发达), and again referring to cars, 
malls and tall buildings, even though none had entered a mall or skyscraper and most had not 
been in a car. The answer of one 10-year-old from Jiangxi is representative: 
 
“Here are many things to do and see. There are big shops and cars…there are many 
new places to visit. It is fun. In the village there are only fields.” 
 
However, unlike the parents, whose views of the city for daughters were, other than in 
education, overwhelmingly positive, many girls also spoke of problems experienced in the 
city. As other studies have indicated, children of both sexes experienced loneliness and 
 12 
discrimination after migration.
23
 Some reported being hit, or having belongings stolen, by 
less-recently-migrated children who bullied newcomers. Many missed the companionship in 
the village. An 11-year-old girl from Jiangxi explained: 
 
“I am lonely. My parents work hard all day and don’t have time to take care of me. 
They come home when I am already asleep… I can eat more food here but I am 
often by myself. I miss my grandmother in my home village. I have few friends in 
school here. My friends are all in the village.” 
 
Though parents were mostly aware that their child experienced loneliness and discrimination 
in Shenzhen, many perceived this as part of the more general problem of the low quality of 
migrant schools, and parents of daughters in particular emphasised that the positive aspects of 
city life outweighed these “educational” disadvantages. When I asked what children gained 
from the new activities and lifestyle, parents repeatedly mentioned skills (jineng 技能 or 
nengli 能力), knowledge (zhishi 知识) and “self-development” (ziwo fazhan 自我发展). This 
last was particularly targeted at girls: only one parent of a boy mentioned self-development, 
compared with 16 parents of girls. Examples of skills included the ability to take a Shenzhen 
city bus, buy food in supermarkets, talk to unfamiliar adults, speak more standard Mandarin 
and use a computer, while “self-development” was more nebulous but included, for many, 
gaining self-confidence and an awareness of “modern life” (xiandai shenghuo 现代生活). 
Some parents explained explicitly why these concerns were relevant for girls in particular. A 
Hunanese mother named Gu told me: 
 
“Especially for a girl, increasing [her] quality (suzhi 素质) is very important, 
especially if she looks for a job here… In our village there are no activities of this 
kind. There is nothing to do, only farm work. It is very backward. For a girl, it is 
very hard to develop one’s self in the village. She will become a housewife. If she 
does not go out [migrate], her experiences will be very limited.” 
 
Most parents stressed that the skills daughters developed in Shenzhen were more important 
than the low quality of their education. However, learning such skills could also be construed 
as a type of education. Liu, a mother from Guangxi, expressed this directly: 
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“Living here is also a kind of education. There is in-school education, and outside-
school education …in Shenzhen children can learn many things outside school. Parents 
perhaps think this is more important than education in school… If they enter the 
factory they will certainly be chosen over workers [who have just come] from the 
countryside. They will certainly be treated better. At that time, they will not be 
peasants…they will be city people (chengshi ren城市人)”. 
 
Liu’s explanation reflects two related ideas about the importance of the city, one instrumental 
and one more intrinsic. The instrumental concern is that the value of schooling is in skills 
acquired, and that more useful skills may be learnt outside formal education. The other 
concern is that that being a “city person” is intrinsically preferable to being a “peasant”, and 
that a child who grows up in Shenzhen will, through the acquisition of urban habits, values 
and ideas, become essentially better than those in the village. Of course, these two concerns 
have considerable overlap, since part of the reason that it is better to be a “city person” is 
because others treat city people preferably, but there also seems to be an endorsement of the 
underlying value judgment about the relative worth of urbanites and peasants. This opinion 
may be shaped by experiences of discrimination after arrival in the city, since some parents, 
particularly mothers, had themselves been called derogatory names both by urbanites and 
less-recent migrants. Country girls (xiangxiamei 乡下妹), little nannies (xiaobaomu 小保姆) 
and fishing girls (laomei 捞妹) were common terms of abuse for migrant women in 
Shenzhen, while men too were labelled country bumpkins (xiangbalao 乡巴佬). However, 
judgments of peasant backwardness were also influenced by the penetration of state 
developmental discourses into rural China. In some cases, these had actually influenced 
migration decisions: the desire to experience the “modern” city was given as a motivation for 
migration by several parents, and even those who expressed nostalgia for their rural home 
described the countryside as backward.  
 
There was a noticeable gender difference in the way that parents related these concepts to 
their children. In addition to Gu above, three other parents referred to their daughters’ suzhi 
as needing improvement or having been improved by migration, whereas none spoke of sons’ 
“quality”. The use of the language of suzhi and self-development almost exclusively for 
daughters mirrors the official state and media depiction of rural women as occupying the 
 14 
lowest rung of the suzhi hierarchy, and suggests that migrants have themselves deeply 
internalised the idea of uncivilised “country girls”.24 Parents’ apparently contradictory 
emphasis on the advantages of city life for their daughters can therefore be seen to stem 
partly from a concern with girls’ “quality”: the increased opportunity for girls to gain suzhi is 
an important aspect of their being in the city. As one mother expressed it:  
 
“For a young girl, the city is much better… I want my daughter to express herself like a 
city person, not an outsider. I don’t want her to be a peasant. I don’t want her to have the 
problems I have. I won’t let my daughter have this inferior status (lieshi diwei 劣势地位).” 
 
A second, more concrete, source of parents’ views that the city is better for girls despite 
lower quality education relates to Liu’s instrumental concern, that more useful, practical 
skills can be learnt in the city than in the countryside. The reason for the gender difference 
here was clear: a statistically significantly greater proportion of parents of girls hoped their 
child would settle long term in the city, where these skills would be needed, than parents of 
boys.
25
 The previous section noted that many more boys than girls would be sent back to the 
village for education. The difference was even more pronounced when parents were asked 
where they would like their child to settle long term. 76% (34) of parents wanted their 
daughter to settle in the city, compared with only 56% (26) who wanted their son to do so. 
Few hoped their child would settle in the village, but 33% (15) did not mind where their son 
settled, compared with only 15% (7) for a daughter. The desire was most common in mothers 
of girls, of whom 25 of 28 wanted their daughter to settle in the city. In order to settle in the 
city as adults, daughters would need not just an abstract attainment of higher suzhi, but 
actual, practical urban life skills. Learning to take a bus, use a computer, shop for food, speak 
standardised Mandarin and so on would be essential for gaining urban employment and, 
perhaps, urban marriage.  
 
 
The benefits of women’s migration and the “urbanisation” of maternal aspirations 
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should settle by child’s sex (P value <0.05) 
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Why did parents, particularly mothers, wish daughters to remain in the city? In addition to 
general reasons for children of both sexes to remain in the city (better employment prospects 
and better standards of living), three groups of reasons were put forward only for girls. These 
tell us much, not only about aspirations for daughters, but also about the advantages married 
women perceive themselves to have gained from migration, and their comparison of gender 
roles in rural and urban China. 
 
The first was that parents felt sex discrimination was less than in rural China where many 
people retained “backward” attitudes. One father from rural Chongqing summed up this idea 
with the optimistic statement that, in Shenzhen, “girls can do anything that boys can do”. 
This was not only a claim about comparatively more equal job prospects for young women in 
Shenzhen, but also about the treatment a woman could expect within her extended family. A 
Sichuanese mother explained that her own husband’s parents held girls in low regard and it 
would be better for her daughter to marry into an urban family, which would not hold such 
attitudes: 
 
“Shenzhen people don’t care if a child is a boy or a girl. People from our village still 
consider giving birth to a girl is inferior. When I gave birth to girls…my mother-in-
law often showed her disappointment. I don’t want my daughters to have this kind of 
experience”. 
 
This relates closely to the second reason, that parents thought it would be better for migrant 
girls to marry later, and at least to another migrant if not an urbanite. Several parents, 
including one father, complained about early marriage practices in their home villages, where 
girls could be engaged from as young as 13 years old. It was therefore widely hoped that 
daughters would marry away from the village. A few mothers wanted their daughters to 
marry urban men and gain urban hukou, while others were more realistic about their 
daughters’ chances of transferring registration status, but still sought to avoid marriage to a 
rural husband. Many aimed for marriage to another migrant, whose worldview would be 
broader than that of a village man and who would not oppose his wife’s future migration. One 
mother from Sichuan explained: 
 
“She and a village man would not be alike. If he hasn’t also been out [migrated], 
hasn’t seen things for himself, he won’t understand her experiences. Probably he 
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wouldn’t want her to go out again. In that way, she would become a village 
housewife and plant the fields.” 
 
That rural men are unwilling for wives to re-migrate after marriage, in part to sustain the 
gender division of labour as a household strategy, has been examined in Fan’s work on the 
relegation of married women to the village.
26
 While the increasing number of married women 
among the new-generation migrants in urban China suggests that this is changing, restrictions 
on future migration was still a concern to parents of girls. Interestingly, not only mothers but 
also two fathers I interviewed were keen to avoid this future for their daughters, suggesting 
perhaps some change in male attitudes as a result of migration.  
 
These attitudes towards daughters’ marriages resemble those other researchers have noted 
unmarried women migrants hold towards their own: dagongmei aim to marry urban men 
whose families will be more “modern” (less patriarchal) than rural in-laws, or at least other 
migrants, who will have less negative views of women’s migration after marriage.27 Among 
my interviewees, not single women but married migrants, the aim was to pass this potential 
benefit of migration on to daughters. Marriage thus becomes a family strategy of social and 
spatial mobility, enabling young women to leave poor rural areas permanently or even, 
perhaps, to acquire formal urban citizenship. However, some parents were aware of possible 
problems. Wang, a mother from Anhui, reflected:  
  
“City men don’t want to marry rural girls - only if they are old, or have physical 
defects, if they can’t find city wives. This kind of unstable marriage will not be good 
for the girl.”  
 
Like other mothers, Wang hoped that her daughter would marry a migrant and live in the 
city, but could again see potential disadvantages. 
 
“If she marries a man from a thousand miles away, she will have to stay in an 
unfamiliar place...for example, after having children. His family will not speak the 
same language. How will she communicate? She will be lonely…the customs will be 
different. They will have little in common. It is better to marry an Anhui man, or to 
stay here to have children and depend on her own family”   
                                                 
26
 Fan, 2003  
27
 Jacka 2006:152 
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This highlights another aspect of parents’ wishes for their daughter to marry migrants in 
Shenzhen: reduced dependence on in-laws and increased closeness with the natal family. By 
remaining in the city, female migrants may still assume traditional gender roles as a mother 
and a wife but will do so much less as a daughter-in-law. A Hunanese woman, who had 
married a Shaanxi migrant in Shenzhen before relocating to her own village and remigrating 
after the birth of her children, emphasised her “little contact” with her husband’s parents. Her 
own parents, living closer to Shenzhen, had looked after her elder daughter for two years. 
Several mothers described a similar pattern. In this regard, a daughter’s marriage to a migrant 
man was regarded as having a positive effect in enhancing the importance of the wife’s natal 
family and eroding traditional patrilineal kin relationships. This may be of particularly 
relevance to migrant families with only one child, who will necessarily depend on their 
daughter for material and emotional support in old age. 
 
The third reason for wanting girls to settle in the city was that they could earn their own 
living. This was expressed only by mothers. While parents of both sexes mentioned better 
employment opportunities, only mothers spoke in terms of standing on one’s own feet or 
supporting oneself (zili 自立). Many scholars, of both China and elsewhere, have pointed out 
that participation in paid labour results in increased autonomy for women after migration.
28
 
However, most analyses of this phenomenon in China focuses solely on young single women, 
many of whom cannot avoid returning to rural areas for marriage.
29
 The little existing work 
on married women’s experiences suggests they do not receive the same benefits. For 
example, Jacka emphasises married women’s labour force disadvantage: it is difficult to find 
paid employment; what work is available is low status, lowly paid and largely invisible; and 
there is little evidence that an independent income allows them to renegotiate familial gender 
relations. In fact, Jacka claims that married women’s position in their families might actually 
decline after migration, because of a higher level of domestic abuse.
30
 This forms a strong 
contrast with the effect of migration on single women, who gain considerably from 
migrating.
31
 However, only two of the married women Jacka interviewed in Beijing in 2001 
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were in independent waged employment. My interview data indicates that there may be 
similar effects for married women in paid labour, or at least that migrant women themselves 
now believe this to be the case, and that their perceptions of the advantages of migration 
influence their desires for an urban future for their daughters. It is therefore problematic to 
assume that married women do not do better as a result of migration, and I suggest there may 
be a more complex interplay between gender, migration and autonomy than has previously 
been explored.  
 
Under the household responsibility system in rural China, farm workers’ income is usually 
measured at household level. Women’s earnings are therefore an invisible component in the 
household economy.
32
 This was true not only in terms of men’s perceptions of their former 
rural lives, but also that of the women themselves. Several mothers interviewed described 
themselves as “unemployed” before migration, but on further probing all were involved in 
farm work. By contrast, after migration only mothers caring for infants described themselves 
as unemployed. Although migrant women’s wages are significantly lower than those of 
migrant men
33
, and although many mothers complained about working conditions, overtime 
and pressure in their Shenzhen employment, most seemed proud of their independent income 
and had aspirations for their daughters to earn a wage. A Hunanese mother who worked long 
hours six days a week as a street tailor spoke proudly of her contribution to the family’s 
income. Other married women, including a factory worker, a cleaner and a street vendor, 
expressed satisfaction that they could earn their own wage. Despite the low social status of 
such work, these jobs were compared positively with having “nothing to do” in the village. 
One mother from Chongqing, referring to her daughter, put it succinctly:  
  
“I don’t want her to go home. Here she can do what she wants – get a job, earn money, 
stand on her own feet. In the village she can’t do anything at all.” 
 
While some mothers, perhaps in households where there were many women to take care of 
household responsibilities and contribute to farming, may genuinely have been 
underemployed before migration, it is unlikely that many had “nothing to do”. This 
expression, which I heard frequently, seemed to be connected more to women’s sense of the 
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“worthlessness” of their rural labour, and suggests again that they had themselves internalised 
the idea of unpaid labour as much less valuable than waged work. However, it was not only 
independent wage labourers who were proud of their work after migration. Even some 
women who worked with their husbands running a family business emphasised their 
contribution to the household income in a way that none did when discussing pre-migration 
work.
34
 One woman said specifically of their fish vending business: “I do half, he does half. 
We are partners”. That this mother also did the majority of childcare and household tasks as 
well as working long hours did not seem to reduce her satisfaction in their working 
arrangements. However, her ambition for her daughter was to find a fixed-hours position in a 
firm, which would be “less pressured” than running a family business.  
 
I suggest, then, that for married women whose labour becomes more visible, and therefore 
valuable, after migration, migrating means an increase in independence, perhaps leading to 
greater authority in household decision-making and control over family resources. In this 
case, it is not surprising that many wish to pass on these benefits to their daughters, by 
encouraging them to remain in the city rather than return to rural China. However, as the 
example above shows, female work force participation does not necessarily improve 
domestic equality. For some women, engaging in paid labour may actually increase their 
overall burden unless they find new alternatives to old roles, particularly those of childcare 
and housework. Therefore, while earning an independent wage may improve women’s social 
status and autonomy, it may not necessarily change their relative position within the family.  
 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of the women themselves, urban life brought significant 
advantages compared with the lot of married women in rural China, and almost all migrant 
mothers therefore expressed the desire that their daughters settle long-term in the city. Girls 
were therefore also better off in the short-term in the city, where they could acquire the skills 
they would need for their future urban lives – not necessarily those they could learn in school. 
Girls were also seen to be more in need of, not just practical skills, but “self-development” 
and “high quality” than boys, in order to become modern citizens of the city, marry a city 
man or at least another migrant, and earn an urban living.  
 
                                                 
34
 This seems to contradict Zhang’s findings from Beijing (Zhang, 2001:118-23) 
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By contrast, girls’ own answers reflected far more their current view of life in Shenzhen, 
taking into account the impact on their wellbeing of loneliness, bullying and discrimination. 
Interestingly, though, despite their answers about where they were happier now, 85% of girls 
(35) hoped to settle as an adult in the city – mirroring the answers of parents as to which 
place was better for girls. For many children, this related to urban career aspirations: girls 
dreamt of becoming city teachers, doctors, policewomen or beauticians. One spoke of 
becoming a “career woman” (nuqiangren 女强人 – literally “strong woman”), while others 
wanted to be an artist, scientist or computer programmer. These dreams are far out of reach 
for most, given the educational deprivation already experienced and the restricted access for 
migrants to senior-high schooling in Shenzhen. Nonetheless, they demonstrate the 
“urbanisation” of migrant girls’ aspirations. Even the two girls who expressed happiness that 
they would be sent home to rural China to continue their education, dreamt of working in the 
city when older. None aspired to rural work, and all expressed repugnance at the idea of 
farming.   
 
Fangfang, a 10-year-old girl hoping to be a teacher, gave a typical answer: 
 
“Farming is dirty and boring, and the money is very little. Nobody wants to 
[do that]”. 
 
Her 15-year-old sister wanted to help me understand. She confirmed Fangfang’s impression 
of farm work, and added: 
 
“If I had to live there [in the village] and live like my grandmother I would 
kill myself. Even death is better than that kind of life….to be a woman in the 
countryside is the worst [situation] of all.” 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The high female-to-male suicide rate in rural China is typically thought to be linked to the 
traditional subordinate relationship of wives to husbands and husbands’ families, as well as 
the heavy burden on women who work in the fields as well as undertaking household 
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labour.
35
 My analysis of the hopes expressed by parents – especially mothers – for their 
daughters suggests that, while women’s burden of work in the city may not be much 
decreased, their subordinate status is subtly changed, at least societally if not necessarily 
within each household, with the increase in participation in paid labour and the distance from 
husbands’ parents. I have argued, against the little existing literature on the migration of 
married women, that these benefits extend to new-generation married migrants in paid work 
as well as dagongmei. Parents, especially mothers, reflect this in their overwhelmingly urban 
ambitions for daughters. Their belief that the city is best for girls now, despite poorer schools, 
reflects specific concerns about daughters’ futures, in terms both of improving their essential 
“quality” and, more importantly, of equipping them with the skills necessary for future city 
life.  
 
Neither of these concerns applies in the same way to migrant boys, who are not the focus of 
such strongly urban aspirations. Already seen as of intrinsically higher suzhi than rural 
women, men also do not benefit as greatly from the instrumental value of urban life. 
Although they enjoy better employment prospects and standards of living in the cities, boys 
do not face sex discrimination, early marriage into patriarchal households, restrictions on 
future migration, the denigration of the contribution of their labour and the lack of an 
independent income if they choose to settle in the countryside. Rural life is therefore seen by 
migrant parents as, and – as rural suicide rates indicate – most likely actually is, much more 
tolerable for Chinese men.  
 
Girls’ own assessments turn far more on their current levels of wellbeing, taking into account 
their concerns with schooling and other issues in Shenzhen. That girls’ satisfaction with city 
life is lower among those who have spent longer in Shenzhen suggests that these concerns 
may become stronger as time passes. Interestingly, though, their longer-term aspirations are, 
like those of parents, strongly urban. Nonetheless, their chances of success may be limited. 
As the third section of this article demonstrated, migrant girls are denied the opportunity to 
gain a decent education which would allow them to fulfil their dreams of becoming urban 
doctors or teachers. As China’s economic development moves towards more skilled 
manufacturing, even much factory work may begin to demand a level of education 
unavailable to migrant girls, many of whom have to drop out after junior-middle school. 
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Furthermore, continued strict conditions for hukou status transfer prevent migrants from 
becoming official urban residents, reducing the ability of rural girls to attract urban husbands. 
These structural and institutional factors, as well as gender discrimination within and beyond 
the household, make it unlikely that migrant girls will be able to build the kinds of lives they 
hope for in urban areas. However, if they remain in the city, in line with the urban aspirations 
of their parents, they may be able to achieve a better, more independent life than that 
available in rural China. 
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